The Next 30 Years: 1983-2013

Commercial Aviation and Air Traffic Control
 

The FAA ordered mandatory proficiency training for controllers working in airport towers handling takeoffs and landings.
 

 

The B-717-200 is designed for short-haul, short-field operations. It can carry 106 passengers in a mixed class configuration up to a range of 2,000 miles. Designed to sustain daily 8 to 12 one-hour flights for fast turnaround at airport gates.

It's BMW/Rolls-Royce BR715 engines were designed for lower fuel consumption, reduced exhaust emissions and significantly lower noise levels. An optional airstair under the main entry door number 1 allows operation at airports where there are no loading bridges or portable stairs.
 

The crew did not recognize that a fire had started and were not warned by instruments. Once they became aware of the fire, the uncertainty of the problem made it difficult to address. The rapid spread of the fire led to the failure of key display systems, and the crew were soon rendered unable to control the jet. Because he had no light by which to see the controls after the displays failed, the pilot was forced to steer the plane blindly. Recovered fragments of the plane show that the heat inside the cockpit became so great that the ceiling started to melt.   (228 Fatalitiies)

Just after 10:00 PM, the flight crew detected an odor in the cockpit and determined it to be smoke from the air conditioning system. The crew turned off the air conditioning vent. Four minutes later, the odor returned and the smoke became visible, prompting the pilots to make a "pan-pan" radio call to the Air Traffic Control Moncton which controls air traffic over the Province of Nova Scotia.

The "pan-pan" call indicated that there was an urgency due to smoke in the cockpit, but they did not declare an emergency as denoted by a "Mayday" call.

The crew requested a diversion to a convenient airport and were given a vector to the Halifax International Airport in Enfield, Nova Scotia, 66 miles away. At 21,000 feet, the crew requested a fuel dump and was diverted toward St. Margaret's Bay, where it was safer to dump fuel, and still 30 miles from Halifax.

The Swissair checklist, 'in case of smoke of unknown origin', the crew shut off the power supply in the cabin, which also turned off the recirculation fans in the ceiling. This created a vacuum in the ceiling space above the passenger cabin and induced the fire to spread into the cockpit, cutting off the power of the autopilot. Ten seconds later, the crew declared an emergency for the third time.

The captain left his seat to fight the fire that was spreading to the rear of the cockpit. Flight data recording shows that engine No. 2 was shut down due to an engine fire, approximately one minute before impact, indicating the first officer was still alive and trying to take back control of the aircraft until the final moments of the flight.

The jet struck the ocean at an estimated speed of 345 mph in a 20 degree nose down and 110-degree bank, or almost inverted. and with a force of the order of 350G, causing the aircraft to disintegrate instantly.

Investigators stated that flammable material used in the jet's structure allowed a fire to spread beyond the control of the crew, resulting in a loss of control and the crash of the aircraft. The in-flight fire, leading to electrical and instrument failure, caused spatial disorientation and loss of control.
 

 

An all-metal, two-seat propeller-driven aircraft powered by a single 210 HP Teledyne Continental Motors engine with a Hartzell propeller, the Ilyushin IL-103 was certified in the utility category.

 

Air traffic controllers issued a weather advisory indicating severe thunderstorms in an area that included the Little Rock airport. Nashville International Airport was designated as an alternate airport or they could have turned back to DFW. The flight crew witnessed lightning produced by the storm while on approach to Little Rock.

The crew was told to expect an approach to Runway 22L, but because of a windshear alert and a change in wind direction, the captain requested Runway 4R for a headwind during landing. Because they were already close to the airport, they were directed away from the airport in order to line them up for a landing on Runway 4R. This resulted in the jet facing away from the airport, and the first officer notified the controller that they had lost sight of the runway because the jet's weather radar had a narrow and forward-facing field of view and they could not see thunderstorms approaching the airport during their turn.

The pilots rushed to land as soon as possible, leading to errors in judgment that included the crew's failure to complete the pre-landing checklist. This was a crucial event as the crew overlooked multiple critical landing systems on the checklist, including failure to arm the automatic spoiler system, failure to set the jet's automatic braking system - both essential to ensure the plane's ability to stop within the confines of a wet runway, especially one that is being subjected to strong and gusting winds. They also failed to set landing flaps.

Two seconds after the wheels touched down, the jet's brakes were ineffective at slowing down the plane continuing down the runway at high speed. Directional control was lost when too much reverse thrust was applied, which reduced the effectiveness of the plane's rudder and vertical stabilizer.

The jet continued past the end of the runway striking a security fence and an ILS localizer, then collided with a structure built to support the landing lights for Runway 22, which extended out into the Arkansas River.

The NTSB conducted extensive testing in order to determine whether the automatic spoiler and brake systems had been armed prior to landing. The NTSB also focused on pilot behavior in inclement weather, to determine what impact the storms had on the pilots' decision-making process while approaching the Little Rock airport.

A study by experts from MIT recording behavior of pilots willing to land in thunderstorms found that pilots exhibited more recklessness if they fell behind schedule; if they were attempting to land at night; and if aircraft in front of them successfully landed in bad weather. Some pilots were less cautious if they were approaching their on-duty limits.
 

Kennedy began taking flying lessons at the Flight Safety Academy in Vero Beach, Florida, and received his pilot's license in April 1998. He did not have an instrument rating (IFR) and was certified to fly only under visual flight rules (VFR). Kennedy had purchased the Saratoga just 3 months before his death. His estimated flying time was about 300 hours, of which 55 hours were at night. His estimated flight time in the Saratoga was about 36 hours. The Saratoga was a more complex airplane then the Cessna Skylane-182 that he previously flew.

Kennedy attended private schools in New York City and graduated from high school at Phillips Academy, Andover, Massachusetts. He majored in American studies at Brown University. He graduated in 1983 with a bachelor's degree in American studies. In 1989 he earned a J.S. degree from the New York University School of Law. He worked as a journalist for the New York Times, and with a friend created "George" Magazine.

The NTSB determined that the probable cause of this crash was pilot error. Kennedy's failure to maintain control of the airplane during a descent over water at night, resulted in spatial disorientation.
 

 

The air traffic controller at Jacksonville ARTCC instructed the pilot to climb and maintain flight level 390 (39,000 feet). The pilot acknowledged. This was the last known radio transmission from the jet, and occurred while the jet was passing through 23,000 feet.

The next attempt to contact the aircraft occurred 2 minutes later with the aircraft at 36,500 feet. Trying to contact the aircraft 5 more times in the next 4 1/2 minutes, they received no response.

A U.S. Air Force F-16 test pilot from Eglin AFB in Florida was directed by controllers to intercept the Learjet. At about 46,000 feet, the test pilot made a visual inspection of the Lear, and found no visible damage. Both engines were running, and the plane's red rotating anti-collision beacon was on. The fighter pilot could not see inside the passenger section of the airplane because the windows seemed to be dark. He also said that the entire right cockpit windshield was opaque, as if condensation or ice covered the inside. He also indicated that the left cockpit windshield was opaque.

Almost 3 hours into the flight, two F-16s from the Oklahoma Air National Guard were directed by Minneapolis ARTCC to intercept the Learjet. They reported no movement in the cockpit and that the windshield was dark and they couldn't tell if the windshield was iced.

A third intercept and escort, two F-16s from the North Dakota Air National Guard also reported cockpit window ice and no movement in any of the control surfaces.

The cockpit voice recorder indicated the engines were winding down and that the plane's fuel had been exhausted. The F-16 pilot said the Learjet was in a descending spiral, and after almost 4 hours the aircraft hit the ground at nearly supersonic speed and an extreme angle, crashing in South Dakota.

The NTSB  listed the probable cause of this accident as the incapacitation of the flight crew members as a result of their failure to receive supplemental oxygen following a loss of cabin pressurization. They also found that the plane had several instances of maintenance work related to cabin pressure, and that at least one instance the plane was flown with an unauthorized maintenance deferral for cabin pressure problems.

Payne Stewart was heading to Houston for the 1999 Tour Championship, but planned a stop in Dallas for discussions with the athletic department of his alma mater, Southern Methodist University, about building a new home course for the school's golf program.
 

 

The NTSB, based on recorded conversations in the cockpit, noted that there were 3 pilots in the cockpit at take-off. The command captain, the command first officer, and the relief first officer. The captain was meant to control the first part of the flight while the relief slept and then they would switch.

But, 20 minutes after take-off the relief said he would not be sleeping, so he would like to control the first portion of the flight while the captain got some sleep. He objected at first saying that he should have been told before, as he had already slept in preparation for the first part of the flight. Some agreement was made that they would switch.

The command pilot left to use the bathroom, and the relief pilot then moved the throttle from cruise to idle and put in the commands for the plane to go into a steep nosedive.

The NTSB concluded that this crash was a result of actions taken by the relief pilot. The reason is unknown why the relief pilot commanded the plane to dive. Egyptian officials contest these conclusions and claim that investigators in the United States were not thorough and that their conclusion is baseless. Their investigation concluded that the crash was a result of a mechanical malfunction. The relief pilot may have been a murderer or he may have been a confused pilot, or he could have been suffering a stroke.

The crash of Egypt Air flight 990 will be forever a mystery. But, after a two-year investigation, the NTSB concluded that the crash was a suicide by a pilot.