The Next 30 Years: 1983-2013

Commercial Aviation and Air Traffic Control
 

The Houston-based cockpit crew was told to descend from 25,000 feet to 18,000 feet. At some point the aircraft steered significantly off the airway for unknown reasons, possibly to avoid weather.

The NTSB was unable to find the flight data recorder or the cockpit voice recorder or other critical information, because the wreckage was spread over a vast area and covered by 20-30 feet of snow.
(29 Fatalities)

Update: In 2016, two men from Massachusetts set out to solve this mystery of a plane crash. They climbed Mount Illimani and found parts of the plane, including a CO2 canister from a life jacket. Warm conditions over the last year revealed what had been encased in ice for decades. They found the cockpit voice recorder. It was demolished but they noticed wires coming out of it had lettering on them: CKPT VO RCDR.

The NTSB said they couldn't look at what they'd found without a request from the Bolivian government, and after several months of phone calls and letters, they managed to break through the bureaucracy.

They are still waiting for an analysis of the tape and hoping that they'll find out what happened on Flight 980.

The NTSB determined that the probable cause was the captain's failure to control and the copilot's failure to monitor the flight path and airspeed of the aircraft. This breakdown in crew coordination followed the onset of unexpected vibration shortly after takeoff. Contributing to the accident was the failure of ground handlers to properly close an air start access door, which led to the vibration.

Also, the ground handler supervisor realized that the headset being used to communicate with the flight crew was nonfunctional, and had to revert to using hand signals. This led the supervisor to signal the flight to taxi before the air start hose was disconnected. The report concluded that the air start access door is what led to the vibrations.

There were 3 survivors, but 2 died in the hospital a few days later.  (70 Fatalities)
 

 

The airspeed continued to decrease, while the autopilot rolled the control wheel to the maximum left limit of 23 degrees. As the speed decreased even further, the jet began to roll to the right, even though the autopilot was maintaining the maximum left roll limit. By the time the captain disconnected the autopilot, the plane had rolled over 60 degrees to the right and the nose had begun to drop. Ailerons and flight spoilers were the only means available to the autopilot to keep the wings level. To counteract the asymmetrical forces created by the loss of thrust from the No. 4 engine, it was essential for the pilot to manually push on the left rudder. However, the captain failed to use any rudder inputs at all.

As the jet descended through clouds, the captain's attention was drawn to the artificial horizon which displayed excessive bank and pitch. Without any visual references and having rejected the information from the artificial horizon display, the crew became spatially disoriented. Only after breaking through the bottom of the clouds at 11,000 feet was the captain able to orient himself and bring the jet under control, leveling out at 9,600 feet. They had descended 30,000 feet in under 2 1/2 minutes, and experienced G-forces as high as 5G.

After leveling out, the 3 remaining engines were supplying normal thrust. A restart attempt brought engine No. 4 back into use, and they began climbing and reported to air traffic control that everything was normal and continued to Los Angeles. Then they noticed that the inboard main landing gear was down, and one of the jet's hydraulic systems was empty. Because they did not have sufficient fuel to reach Los Angeles with the drag added by the landing gear, they diverted to San Francisco. An emergency was declared and they flew straight to SFO.

 Only 2 passengers were injured, but the aircraft was significantly damaged by the excessive G-forces. The wings were permanently bent upwards by 2 inches, the inboard landing gear lost two actuator doors, and the two inboard main gear struts were left dangling. Most affected was the tail, where large outer parts of the horizontal stabilizer had been ripped off. The entire left outboard elevator had been lost along with its actuator, which had  been powered by the hydraulic system that ruptured and drained. After repairs were made to the jet it returned to service 3 months later.
 

The hijackers murdered one passenger, a U.S. Navy diver. They released the other 155 hostages (including 39 Americans) in stages, the last being freed on June 30. The Lebanese authorities held the jet in Beirut until August 16.    (1 American Fatality)

 
    July 24, 1985 - FAA announced the award of a contract to upgrade the Automated Radar Terminal System (ARTS II) giving it certain additional safety features including conflict alert and Minimum Safe Altitude Warning capabilities. Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor for ARTS.

The new installations were designated the "Host" Computer Systems (HCSs) because of their ability to run the existing 9020 software package with minimum modifications.
 

The tower controller advised Flight 191 that there was wind gusting up to 15 knots, which the captain acknowledged. The flight crew lowered the landing gear and extended the flaps for landing.

From this point the aircraft began a descent from which it never recovered. The angle of attack was over 30 degrees, and varied wildly over the next few seconds. The pitch angle began to sink and the jet started descending below the glide slope.

The aircraft struck the ground over a mile short of the runway hitting a car and two water tanks before disintegrating.

"Lightning coming out of that one...right ahead of us," the captain called out as they were at 1,000 feet and 14 seconds later he cautioned the copilot to watch his airspeed. Then warned "you're gonna lose it, all of a sudden, there it is" and then "push it up, push it way up". Several seconds later the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded the sound of the engines spooling up. "That's it" and "hang on to the son of a bitch!"

The captain gave the order to apply maximum thrust and abort a landing by taking off and going around. The first officer responded by pulling up and raising the nose of the jet, which slowed but did not stop the plane's descent - still descending at a rate of approximately 10 feet per second. The landing gear made contact with a plowed field north of the runway. Remaining structurally intact, Flight 191 remained on the ground while rolling at high speed across the farmland.

The jet struck a highway street light and its nose gear touched down on the highway. The left engine hit a Toyota Celica and killed the driver instantly. As the jet continued south, it hit two more street lights and began fragmenting. The left horizontal stabilizer, some engine pieces, portions of the wing control surfaces, and parts of the nose gear came off of the aircraft as it continued traveling along the ground. Witnesses said there was fire coming from the left wing.

Surviving passengers reported that fire began entering the cabin through the left wall while the plane was still in motion. The jet finally stopped when it crashed into a pair of water tanks on the edge of the airport property. As the left wing and nose struck the water tank, the fuselage rotated counterclockwise and was engulfed in a fireball.

Most of the survivors were located in the rear smoking section of the aircraft which broke free from the main fuselage before the jet hit the water tanks.

The NTSB listed the cause of this crash was pilot error (for their decision to fly through a thunderstorm), combined with extreme weather phenomena associated with microburst-induced wind shear. The NTSB also determined that a lack of specific training, policies, and procedures for avoiding and escaping low-altitude wind shear was a contributing factor.

Of the 163 passengers and crew, 134 persons aboard the plane and one person on the ground died.  (135 Fatalities)
 

Climbing to 24,000 feet, 12 minutes after take-off, the Jet was shaken by a depressurization explosion, and the captain was getting no response from his controls as a result of a total loss of hydraulic pressure.                          

The engines were still operating and the pilots attempted to direct the jet using the engines alone, and lowered the landing gear to try to help control the speed and stability. At 22,000 feet complete control was lost and the jet banked in a full circle. Heading towards Mount Osaka, the crew applied full power to climb, but the jet began to pitch up and down wildly, and the airspeed dropped rapidly to 108 knots. The B-747 crashed into the side of Mount Osaka at 4,780 feet.  Four people survived.  (524 Fatalities)
 

The weather had been deteriorating with a reported 300-foot obscured indefinite ceiling and visibility of 1-mile in light drizzle. The crew were advised by a controller in Portland, that they were drifting east of the ILS approach course to runway 4 at Auburn. The controller advised them they were passing the Lewie NDB beacon at the outer marker for the approach. They were then cleared to switch to the airport's frequency which was the last transmission received from the flight. 

The aircraft flew into trees less than one mile from the end of runway 4 and struck the ground less than 500 feet to the right of the extended runway center line.  (8 Fatalities)

The NTSB noted that the controller in Portland used 'poor judgment' assisting the flight. However, it concluded that the captain accepted the large course correction and the crew continued flying an unstabilized approach instead of executing a missed approach. An incorrect altimeter setting may have caused the descent to continue below the published decision height. At night, in low visibility, the crew may have been unaware of their true position.
 

Noise abatement takeoff procedures were in effect and Midwest Express used reduced thrust takeoff procedures to extend engine life. The DC-9 accelerated to 168 knots with a climb rate of about 3,000 feet/minute, indicating a normal two-engine initial takeoff flight path. At 450 feet there was a loud noise and a noticeable decrease in engine sound. The air traffic controller observed smoke and flames emanating from the right engine. Neither pilot made the call outs for 'Max Power' or 'Ignition Override-Check Fuel System' which were part of  the Midwest Express 'Engine Failure after V1" emergency procedure. The vertical acceleration dropped sharply and the airplane stalled, and crashed. (31 Fatalities)

The NTSB said the probable cause was the flight crew's improper use of flight controls in response to the catastrophic failure of the right engine during a critical phase of flight, which led to an accelerated stall and loss of control. The right engine failed from the rupture of the 9th to 10th stage removable sleeve spacer in the high pressure compressor because of the spacer's vulnerability to cracks.
 

   September 16, 1985 -  The FAA dedicated the last of 800 solid-state VORTAC air navigation aids. The new VORTACs are more reliable and energy-efficient than the tube-type equipment they replaced.

The new VORTACs are the first FAA systems to have Remote Maintenance Monitoring (RMM), a feature that greatly reduced the need for site visits..

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The Canadian Aviation Safety Board cited ice accumulation on the leading surfaces of the wings, combined with the loss of thrust from one engine. It was also concluded that an in-flight explosion was likely.

Everyone on the DC-8 died, including 248 U.S. soldiers returning from the Mideast. (256 Fatalities)

The FAA increased surveillance of Arrow Air and its in-depth inspection of airlines operating under military charter, resulting in the grounding of all 10 of Arrow Air's DC-8s pending replacement of unapproved spare parts.